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This paper looks again at the U.S. deficit debate of the 1980s, this time with the benefit of
the Commerce Department's newly revised data for that period and also in light of the experience
of the 1990s when sizeable budget surpluses replaced chronic large deficits. The familiar conclusion
that sustained government deficits at full employment depress private capital formation has stood
up well in both regards. By contrast, the more recent experience in particular has sharply
contradicted any simple notion that the government balance and the current account balance move
in parallel. Other relevant issues include the equilibrium (that is, noninflationary) unemployment
rate, the response of private saving to government dissaving, and the role of debt and equity in







bfriedman@harvard.eduWHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM THE REAGAN DEFICITS
—ANDTHEIR DISAPPEARANCE?
Benjamin M. Friedman
Robert Eisner was a forceflul and tireless advocate for the kind of economics, and,
importantly, the kird of economic policy, that he thought right. In his mind the two were largely
the same. To Bob, the point of economic theory and empirical analysis was to further the ability
to shape public policy in the interest of the working men and women who comprise the vast
majority of the nation's citizens. Economics that did not somehow bear on practical questions of
public policy was at best suspect, and more likely irrelevant. At the same time, economic policy
initiatives that lacked firm underpinnings in theory and evidence were likely to prove at best
misguided and possibly counterproductive. The commitment and integrity that Bob brought to his
work on economics and economic policy —indeed,the sometimes surprising ferocity from such a
gentle man —shouldstand as a model for serious scholars in our discipline.
That said, I disagreed with Bob Eisner on a significant matter of both economics and
economic policy. The issue on which we differed was what to think about the historically large
budget deficits that the U.S. Government ran in the 1980s and for some years into the 1990s, and
what, as a matter of public policy, to do about them. Earlier, in the mid 1 970s, we had both-2-
argued that the deficits the government ran in the immediate post-OPEC years need not be cause
for concern. Bob, in his pioneering work with Paul Pieper, showed that under aproper
accounting, crucially including allowance for the implications of the rapid price inflation of that
time, the deficits the government was then running were not so large after all and might even be
surpluses. I focused instead on the country's available unused economic resources, arguing that
below fill employment the much discussed "crowding out" of investment attributed to the effects
of government borrowing might even be "crowding in." But by the mid 1980s inflation had
slowed and the American economy had returned to conventional full-employment benchmarks.
And at that point our respective views on the deficit question diverged.
The end of the 1990s is an appropriate time to review these issues (in Bob's absence,
sadly) for two reasons. First, as remarkable as the deficits of the 1980s and early 1990s were,
since then their disappearance and the emergence instead of sizeable surpluses have comprised an
even more remarkable fiscal phenomenon. And second, the Commerce Department has only just
completed a major revision of the U.S. national income and product accounts, including changes
in the saving and investment concepts that are central to any debate over how government budget
imbalances affect economic activity. The object of this paper is therefore both to review and to
extend the "deficit debate," looking once again at the experience of the Americaneconomy under
large deficits but also considering the new developments that have emerged as the deficit has
disappeared.-3-
Deficits into Surpluses, and the Fin de Siecle Expansion
On at least one question, Bob Eisner has proved right and most of the rest of the
American economics profession wrong. Perhaps the easiest way to reconcile Bob's ready
acceptance of the Reagan-era deficits with the opposition of so many economists who in other
respects thought the way he thought is to say that they (we) assumed the American economy was
filly employed and he didn't. In one sense —perhapsthe most important sense —itis to Bob's
credit that he was never satisfied to consider a measured unemployment rate of,say, 6% as "fill
employment." In his view that meant accepting the inevitability of some six million men and
women (today it would be more) failing to find work, a situation that he found morally repugnant.
If the 6.1% unemployment that the United States maintained onaverage during 1985-90, for
example, were known to have been well above the corresponding "fill employment" rate, then
many economists who viewed the deficits of that time with alarm would have had a more benign
prospect.
The question at issue here is not, of course, how many potential workers one should want
to see jobless, but rather how to think about the role of macroeconomic policy. If"fIill-
employment unemployment" (or in the more precise phase coined by Franco Modigliani, the
"non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment") was 6%, as Robert Gordon and many others
maintained, then further stimulating aggregate demand for goods and services by iy means —
fiscal,monetary, whatever —wouldonly have led to renewed inflation. The laudable goal of
putting more willing Americans to work was therefore a task for labor market reforms, or training
programs to enhance workers' skills, or perhaps basic education, but in any case not stimulative
macroeconomic policy. Further, with the economy's resources already fully employed, either-4-
government spending programs or tax cuts that spurred consumption necessarily drew resources
away from some other application, like domestic investment or production for export, or else
forced higher imports, and more probably did both. By contrast, if fill-employment
unemployment were well below 6%, increased government spending and reduced taxes that
spurred demand and thereby created jobs would not have been inflationary. And fiscal stimulus
need not have crowded out investment, and might even have crowded in some.
The discussion below re-examines the I 980s from the perspective ofjust these questions.
But it is worth recognizing at the outset that unemployment in the United States has now fallen to
levels far below what not long ago most economists other than Bob Eisner thought, with high
confidence, would prove inflationary. The widely cited 1997 paper by Douglas Staiger, James
Stock and Mark Watson, for example, concluded by highlighting economists' empirical ignorance
about the level of"NAIIRU," arguing in effect that it could lie anywhere within a three percentage
point range. But that range was 5-8% of the labor force. Yet the U.S. unemployment rate moved
to 4.9% in 1997, 4.5% in 1998 and 4.2% in 1999, and as yet there has been no visible acceleration
in any major recognized price index.
As many economists have now argued (for example, Robert Gordon and Lawrence Katz),
this highly welcome development of the mid to late 1990s need not be inconsistent with the more
pessimistic macroeconomic view of a decade and more ago. Under that view it would take
microeconomic changes to push fill-employment unemployment lower, and many such changes
have in fact occurred. The rapidly expanding literature of this subject has pointed to
developments like the growing role of temporary employment agencies, the new ifingibility of the
set of basic skills needed to use a personal computer keyboard, the rising U.S. prison population,-5-
thedeclining power of trade unions, the eroding real level of the legal minimum wage, and so on.
Evaluating these and other potential explanations for the happy economic results of the late 1990s
lies beyond the scope of this paper, But the fact remains that by now unemployment has for some
years remained well below what used to be conventionally accepted flu-employment benchmarks,
with no sign of greater inflation. Bob Eisner would surely not have been surprised.
By contrast, what would have surprised Bob Eisner —andthis goes to the heart of the
argument over the role of government budget imbalances —isthat therapideconomic growth
that has brought unemployment to this low level has occurred not only without a fiscal deficit but
with a growing surplus in the U.S. Government's consolidated accounts. A constant theme in
Bob's writing on this subject was the claim that fiscal deficits were not only not harmful but
actually necessary to achieve full employment. In effect, his view was that no successful and
lasting economic expansion could occur without positive fiscal stimulus. Implicitly, and
sometimes explicitly, this view amounted to rejecting theefficacyof monetary policy with respect
to real economic activity. In contrast to the conventional notion that therearetwo forms of
potential macroeconomic policy stimulus, fiscal and monetary, such that either can be sufficient to
spur an underemployed economy to full employment, Bob in effect thought that for this purpose
only fiscal policy mattered. The evidence of the mid to late 1990s has plainly run the other way.
The turnaround in the U.S. Government's fiscal position in the 1990s has been perhaps the
most remarkable shift in fiscal policy observed in this country's history apart from the immediate
consequences of major wars. In the 1992 fiscal year, the government's unified deficit was $290
billion, or 4.7% of U.S. gross domestic product. In fiscal 1999 the government ran a unified
surplus of $123 billion, or 1.4% of GDP. Calculated by the Congressional Budget Office on a-6-
standardized employment basis, to eliminate the endogenous effects of recession and recovery on
both taxes and spending, the budget moved from a deficit equal to 3.0% of potential GDP in 1992
to an even balance in 1999. Moreover —andthis is the main point —throughthe course of this
fiscal turnaround the American economy's real growth averaged a robust 3.7% per annum over
the seven years 1993-99.
How about investment, the particular focus of so much of the debate over the impact of
fiscal imbalances in the I 980s? Here too, the evidence is broadly consistent with the view that
connects deficits at frill employment (although, again, what is fUll employment in the 1990s?) with
crowding out of domestic investment, and the elimination of fUll-employment deficits with a
relaxation of constraints on investment.
Contrary to the fears repeatedly voiced by critics of the 1990 and 1993 tax increases that
were a significant part of the story of the 1990s fiscal turnaround (for example, Martin Feldstein),
business fixed investment has grown more rapidly than any other major component of U.S.
aggregate demand. From 1993 through 1999, real investment in plant and equipment expanded
on average by an astonishing 9.8% per annum, compared to 3,7% for real GDP overall, So much
for the idea that modestly higher marginal tax rates on upper-income individuals would so blunt
incentives as to throttle investment.
Further, the rise in the American economy's gross investment rate implied by this sharp
difference in the respective growth rates of investment and GDP in the mid to late I 990s also
carried over to net investment, which presumably matters more for enhancing productivity and
therefore long-mn economic expansion. The lowest rate of net investment in plant and equipment
(as a share of GDP) recorded in the nearly four decades spanned by the Commerce Department's-7-
revised data series, just 1.5%, occurred in 1992. To be sure, the investment rate usually drops
during and immediately after business recessions, and the 1990-91 recession was no exception in
this regard. But as Figure 1 shows, the decline in investment experienced even in the wake of
recessions far more severe than that of 1990-91 never approached such a low level. In 1975 and
1976 net investment declined to 3.1% of GDP. In 1983 the low point was 3.0%. It is difficult to
avoid the inference that the far larger full-employment deficit that the government ran before,
during and after the 1990-91 recession was at least partly responsible for the record low net
investment rate.
More importantly, as Figure 1 also makes clear, net investment as a share of GDP has
recovered sharply since 1991 as the deficit has disappeared. Indeed, by 1998 net investment had
risen to 4.0% of GDP, identical to the 1961-80 average. And when net investment data for 1999
become available, they will probably show yet a further increase. (Gross investment in plant and
equipment in 1999 was 13.7% of GDP, versus 12.6% in 1998, and it would be unusual for capital
consumption to have increased this sharply relative to GDP in just one year.)
Some Puzzles Posed by the Expansion
The comovements among budget deficits or surpluses, overall economic growth, and
growth in both gross and net investment during the 1 990s have been broadly consistent with the
basic relationships to which critics of the Reagan deficits pointed. Even so, the experience of
these years raises sezeral interesting puzzles that should preclude any tendency toward
complacency among macroeconomists.-8-
First, most of the concerns expressed over the outsized deficits of the Reagan-Bush era
reflected the belief not only that large deficits at thuemploymentcrowd out investment but also
that investment in factories, machinery, office equipment and the like —thatis, increments to the
economy's stock of physical capital —arean important ingredient to productivity growth. And
yes, at a broad-brush level, the rapid expansion of investment in the 1990s has gone along with a
welcome increase in Anerica's productivity growth. Productivity has advanced especially rapidly
thus far during the second half of the decade: in the nonfarm business sector, 2.6% per annum on
average during 1996-99.
But the growth of employment during the economic expansion of the 1990s has also been
unusually rapid, so much so that real physical capital per worker has declined. According to the
Commerce Department's latest capital stock data —which,perhaps importantly, do not yet
reflect the latest benchmark revisions of the NRA investment data —theamount of capital for
each worker in the economy's nonfarm business sector peaked at $82,600 (measured in 1997
dollars) in 1992. The capital-labor ratio then fell in each of the next three years, reaching S81,100
in 1995. Small increases since then have brought the amount of capital for each worker back only
to $81,900 in 1997 (capital stock data for 1998 or 1999 are not yet available as of the time of
writing). Yet this period of unincreasing capital intensity has seen the best productivity
performance in years.
One popular interpretation of these facts would be that in the "new economy" physical
capital matters less than either human capital or the stock of knowledge that is embodied in
neither machines nor labor. An alternative interpretation would point out that different vintages
of physical capital embody different technologies, and go on to emphasize the role of rapidly-9-
expanding gross investment in increasing the intensity of up-to-date capital even as rapidly
expanding labor input is eroding the intensity of older capital. Evaluating these and other possible
explanations for these particular facts at hand lies beyond the scope of this paper. But the fact of
rapid productivity growth in the face of a declining overall capital-labor ratio (at least on the
currently available capital stock data) is a flag of caution against too readily concluding that all of
the events of the 1990s have affirmed the assumptions underlying the standard argument against
large deficits in the 1980s.
Second, the decline of private saving in the 1990s raises anew the question of whether, as
suggested long ago by David Ricardo and forcefblly articulated in modern times by Robert Barro,
individuals take account of the implications of government borrowing for ifiture debt service
obligations and hence future taxes, and adjust their own consumption-saving behavior in response.
As Figure 2 and Table I show, in the 1980s U.S. private saving rates did not rise on average and
even felt somewhat, thereby contradicting the Barro-Ricardo prediction of what would happen in
response to the widening budget deficit. But the continued and much sharper decline of private
saving in the 1990s, as government dissaving has given way to government saving, j consistent
with the Barro-Ricardo equivalence proposition, And if this proposition is correct, then swings in
the government budget due to tax changes need not affect the economy's saving-investment
balance at all (they might do so if marginal tax rates changed, but that is a different matter), and
budget swings due to changes in government spending would matter but in a different way.
It is far too soon to embrace such a conclusion. Private saving moves in response to many
forces apart from government saving or dissaving, whether the Barro-Ricardo proposition is true
or not. Indeed, much of the literature of this subject over the past decade and more has been-10-
devotedto parsing out the effects of such other influences in the 1980s, to see if Ricardo
equivalencemight have been atwork after all. (A concise but fair summary of the answer is no.)
Especially for the period since private saving began its most precipitous decline, in 1993, the
obvious influence to which to point is capital gains. Not only have equity prices risen
extraordinarily during these years, but under the Commerce Department's new measurement
concepts all such gains —eventhose distributed in cash by mutual fbnds, which most
shareholders probably see as indistinguishable from cash dividends —areexcluded from income
and hence from saving as well. But this situation too respresents a challenge for new research in
the field.
Third, and somewhat apart from the gross mechanics of the economy's saving-investment
balance, the growing role of equity inflows in the financing of American business in the I 990s
raises once again the old question of whether interest rates are a useful guide to the influence of
fiscal and monetary policies on investment, The simplest way of explaining the market mechanism
by which aggregate saving and aggregate investment are brought into equality —theversion of
the story that, in one form or other, appears in most macroeconomics textbooks —centerson the
negative interest elasticity of investment, Years ago, however, James Tobin showed that interest
rates need not be decisive in this context if investment relies on equity finance and debt and equity
instruments have different risk properties so that asset holders regard them as imperfect
substitutes.
The American investment boom of the 1990s has occurred in the presence of a
disappearing federal government deficit but also at a time of historically high real interest rates.
During 1993-99 long-term Treasury bond yields averaged 4.66% above the average percentage—11—
increase in the GDP chained price index, and the corresponding differential for Baacorporate
bonds was 6.11%. For high-grade debt instruments, these are high real returns by U.S.postwar
standards. (At the time of writing the stated real yield on inflation-protected long-term Treasury
bonds was 4.28%.) But especially in sectors of the economy that are driven by new technology,
the 1990s have also seen a surge in new stock offerings as well as an enormous flourishing of
America's venture capital industry. Has Tobin's three-asset model finally become essential for
understanding the U.S. economy's investment process?
A Look Back at the 1980s with the Newly Revised NIPA Data
In light of the Commerce Department's just-completed benchmark revisions of the U.S.
national income and product accounts, it is also worth while to look once again at the basic
magnitudes at issue in the 1980s deficit debate. Do previous conclusions on the major questions
at issue still hold up? In short, yes.
As the decade averages presented in Table I show, all forms of U.S. net private domestic
investment fell as a share of GDP in the 1980s compared to the 1960s and 1970s: net investment
in plant and equipment, net residential construction, and accumulation of business inventories.
Moreover, as is clear from Figure 1, especially for plant and equipment the decline in the
investment rate continued throughout the decade, so that comparing the 1 980saverage to the
1970s average far understates the magnitude of the decline during this period. Even leaving aside
the recession year 1990, the 2.7% net investment rate for both 1987 and 1988, and just 2.8% in
1989, were at that time the lowest levels recorded in more than a quarter century. (Similarly,
comparing the 1990s average to that of the 1980s completely mises the sharp revival that began in-12-
1993.) The Commerce Department's various redefinitions of capital and investment —for
example, including computer software —slightlyraised the average investment rate in each
decade, but did not alter the basic conclusion that net investment shrank as a share of GDP as the
deficit widened. Nor was it true that Americans invested less in factories and machinery because
they were investing more in housing for a growing population. The share of GDP devoted to net
residential construction declined as well in the 1980s.
Next, a useful point frequently made by Bob Eisner is that private investment is not the
only kind of potentially productive capital formation. The highways, airports, seaports and
research laboratories built and maintained directly by government are also part of the nation's
capital stock. As some economists have argued (for example, David Aschauer), there is evidence
for the United States showing that, at the margin, publicly provided capital may be just as
effective in enhancing the economy's productivity as that provided by the private sector. Bob
often made this point by asking (rhetorically) what harm is done, even if deficit financing does
crowd out private investment, if the purpose of the deficit is to finance public investment.
A decade ago the national income and product accounts did not include government
investment as an expenditure category distinct from other government spending. Newer data do,
and so it is now straight forward to address this issue in ways that were not then possible. As
Figure 3 shows, the share of GDP devoted to net investment by the federal government did rise
during the 1980s. But that increase was small compared to the decline in the U.S. net private
investment rate —seeagain Figure 1 —andit was especially small compared to the enlargement
of the federal deficit. The increase in federal investment was hardly the main story of how the
Reagan deficits occurred. (Moreover, as Treasury expenditure data showed at the time, much of-13-
the physical capital formation that the federal government undertook in the 1980s was for defense
installations. The share of federal spending that went into gross nondefense capital formation
declined.)
Third, the Commerce Department's various conceptual redefinitions of the relevant
income and saving data --mostimportantly, the inclusion in personal income of additions to state
andlocalgovernment employees' retirement hinds --nowmake the I 980s decline in net personal
saving, and therefore in overall net private saving, look more modest than it did before. In the
revised data personal saving is consistently greater in every year, but the difference is not uniform
across time. The old data showed net personal saving as a percentage of GDP rising from 5.3%
on average in the 1960s to 5.8% in the 1970s, and then falling to just 4.8% in the 1980s. By
contrast, as Table 2 shows, according to the new data net personal saving rose from 5.9%ofGDP
on average in the 1960s to 6.9% in the 1970s and then fell, but only to 6.5, in the 1980s.
Although the relevance of both corporate and state-local government pension accumulations to
personal saving behavior is well known in the literature, for those who prefer to look simply at the
personal saving data alone the contradiction of the Barro-Ricardo equivalence proposition in the
1980s, while still apparent, is now less sharp. (The new data show a slightly greater drop in net
corporate saving from the 1970s to the 1980s, and so the difference that the revision makes for
private saving overall is slightly less than for personal saving alone.)
Finally, nothing in the new data revision has affected the conclusion that a major part of
the "crowding out" due to the Reagan-era deficits appeared in the economy's international sector.
One of the biggest surprises of the 1980s for many economists was the extent to which, as Figure
4 shows, the American economy was able to cushion the federal deficit's absorption of domestic-14-
U.S. saving by drawing on saving done by foreigners, as the United States switched from a capital
exporting country to a capital importer —inother words, from positive to negative net foreign
investment. Viewed from a real rather than financial perspective, what happened was that the
U.S. economy ran a trade deficit and thereby turned to foreign production to allow it to consume
and invest in excess of what it could produce domestically, and hence, on net, borrowing from the
rest of the world rather than lending to it. In the process, America quickly went from the world's
largest creditor country to the world's largest debtor.
One of the most interesting developments of the late 1990s, as Figure 4 also shows, is the
reappearance of a large negative net foreign investment balance just as the federal deficit has
given way to a surplus. While the 1 980s showed that the United States is a sufficiently open
economy that under some circumstances a budget deficit can crowd out the foreign sector too,
the 1990s has put firmly to rest any naive version of the "twin deficits" view of the effects of
government imbalances.
Concluding Remarks
The facts change from one decade to the next —thatis part of what makes economics so
endlessly fascinating —butmany of the questions that economists put to those facts remain.
They do so both because the analytical issues that these questions involve are interesting in
themselves and also because they bear on perennial matters of public policy import. Bob Eisner
knew that. He would have enjoyed debating the issues that the new developments of the 1990s,
and the new view of the I 980s provided by revised data, have thrown up to us. I suspect that he-I5-
would have disagreed with part, maybe even much, of what I have written in thispaper. I am
sorry he is not here to say so.-16-
TABLE 1
U.S. NET SAVING-INVESTMENT BALANCE. 1960-1998
1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-98
TotalNetlnvestment 11.1% 9.6% 6.1% 5.0%
Private Domestic 8.0 8.1 6.4 5.2
Plantand Equipment 3.9 4.1 3.4 2.6
Residential Construction 3.1 3.4 2.6 2.2
Inventory Accumulation 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.5
Government 2.4 1.2 1.4 1.0
Federal 0.4 (0.1) 0.4 0.1
State and Local 2.0 1.3 0.9 1.0
Net Foreign 0.6 0.2 (1.7) (1.2)
TotalNet Saving 10.7% 8.5% 5.6% 4.7%
Private 9.7 9.8 8,8 7.0
Personal 5.9 6.9 6.5 4.5
Corporate 3.8 2.9 2.3 2.5
Government 1.0 (1.2) (3.2) (2.3)
Federal 0.1 (1.9) (3.5) (2.5)
State and Local 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2
Notes: Data shown as percentages of gross domestic product.
Total saving and total investment differ because of statistical discrepancy.
Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.





Figure 1: Federal Deticitlsurpius and Net Investment, 1959-1998




Figure 2: Federal deficit/Surplus and Net Saving, 1959-1 998





Figure 3: Federal Deficit/Surplus and Net Government Investment, 1959-1996
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Figure 4: Federal Deficit/Surplus and Net Foreign Investment, 1959-1998
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